Abstract-Secret key agreement (SKA) is an essential primitive in cryptography and information security. In a multiterminal key agreement problem, there are a set of terminals each having access to a component of a vector random variable, and the goal of the terminals is to establish a shared key among a designated subset of terminals. This problem has been studied under different assumptions about the adversary. In the most general model, the adversary has access to a random variable Z, that is correlated with all terminals' variables. The single-letter characterization of the secret key capacity of this model, known as the wiretap secret key capacity, is not known for an arbitrary Z. In this paper, we calculate the wiretap secret key capacity of a Tree-PIN, when Z consists of noisy version of terminals' variables. We also derive an upper bound and a lower bound for the wiretap secret key capacity of a PIN, and prove their tightness for some special cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of a secret key agreement (SKA) protocol is to establish a shared secret key (SK) among a designated set of users such that those that are outside the group have no information about the key. This problem has been studied in different models. The problem of two-party SKA in the source model was first considered independently in [1, 2] . In this model, Alice and Bob (terminals) have access to samples of two correlated variables X and Y . The adversary, Eve, has access to a third correlated variable Z, and P XY Z is the publicly known joint probability distribution. Terminals can communicate over a public authenticated channel to obtain a shared SK. A key agreement protocol in general has two phases: a public discussion phase during which participants communicate over the public channel to arrive at a common string, and privacy amplification phase in which a common uniform random key is extracted from the common string.
The general multiterminal source model extends the twoparty model to the case where there are m terminals M " t1, . . . , mu, and the goal is for a subset A Ď M to obtain a shared secret key K. The model assumes that all terminals cooperate including those in A c " MzA. Let X j denote the random variable that is available to terminal j, and let X M be the vector of m correlated random variables, pX 1 , . . . , X m q. Eve's side information Z about the terminals' variables satisfies the joint probability distribution P ZXM , which is known publicly. The model was first proposed by Csiszár and Narayan [3] , who studied three notions of capacity depending on the assumption about Z.
1) Secret Key (SK) capacity:
The adversary has no information about X M .
2) Private Key (PK) capacity: A known (by all terminals) subset of terminals D Ď A c are compromised and Z " X D , where X D is the set of variables of D.
3) Wiretap Secret Key (WSK) capacity: The adversary has access to a random variable Z, which is correlated with X M , and P ZXM is publicly known.
In all cases, the adversary also has full read access to the public messages denoted by F. WSK capacity corresponds to the most general model, and SK and PK capacities are defined for special cases of the general model.
The above general multiterminal source model was formalized in [3] where a single-letter characterization of SK and PK capacities were proved. Here, the secret key capacity of a model is the maximum (asymptotically) achievable key rate of that model. Finding a general expression for WSK capacity, even for the special case of two terminals (|M| " 2) is an open problem.
The Pairwise Independent Network (PIN) model [4] is a special case of the general model of [3] and was inspired by wireless settings where each pair of terminals can derive correlated variables from their shared channel. A PIN is defined by an undirected graph where corresponding to each edge between i and j (i ‰ j P M), there exists a variable V ij accessible to terminal i, and a second variable V ji accessible to terminal j. The set of all "reciprocal pairs" of variables (i.e., tpV ij , V ji q| i, j P M, i ă ju) are mutually independent. An upper bound on the SK capacity of PIN is given in [4] , and a capacity achieving SKA protocol when A " M, or when |A| " 2, was proposed in [5] . The WSK capacity of a general PIN is not known.
Our Work:
We consider the Tree-PIN model, that is a special case of PIN where we assume V ij " V ji , and the defining graph is an undirected tree. We derive the WSK capacity for A Ď M, when the adversary's side information Z consists of noisy versions of the pairwise random variables V ij 's. We also present an SKA protocol that achieves this capacity. We show that the WSK capacity of a Tree-PIN model is equal to the PK capacity of an auxiliary model in which there exists an additional cooperating dummy terminal that is compromised, and has only access to the variable Z, that is the adversary's side information.
Our results for Tree-PIN lead to an upper bound and a lower bound on the WSK capacity of the general wiretapped PIN, using the Steiner Tree Packing of [5] . We also show that these bounds are tight for the special cases of A " M and |A| " 2.
Related Work:
The SK and PK capacities of PIN have been studied when random variables are defined over a finite filed [6, 7] , and for special graphical connectivities [8, 9] . A generalization of PIN model to hypergraphical sources is introduced in [10] , and the SK capacity of such sources has been studied in [10] [11] [12] .
The multiterminal WSK capacity for special forms of the adversary's information are given in [3, 5] . For example, in [5] , the wiretap secret key capacity of a PIN model was calculated, in which a single terminal is compromised, and is not cooperating thereafter for key agreement. In this case, let d P M be the compromised terminal, then for each j ‰ d, Eve has access to a variable V dj that is correlated with V jd , which is only with one of the m´1 variables accessible to terminal j. Thus, Eve's side information is of the form Z " tV dj | j P Mztduu.
We consider a more general adversarial model for PIN, in which Eve has access to noisy versions of all pairwise variables V ij . That is assuming the adversary's side information Z is of the form Z " tZ ij | i ă ju, where Z ij is correlated with V ij , for all i ‰ j P M.
Organization:
We review the basic notions and definitions in Section II. Then, we present our main result and the sketch of our proofs in Section III. Section IV concludes the paper by presenting some extended results and remarks.
II. MULTITERMINAL SOURCE MODEL FOR SKA
We restrict ourselves to discrete probability distributions. We reserve upper-case letters for random variables (RVs) and lower-case letters to denote their realizations. Upper-case calligraphic letters (e.g., M, A, etc. ) denote sets, and for any natural number m we define rms :" t1, . . . , mu. Let M " rms, then X M :" pX 1 , . . . , X m q and X A " pX j | @j P Aq for any A Ď M. For an arbitrary real vector R M " pR 1 , . . . , R m q P R m and for any A Ď rms we define R A " pR j | @j P Aq, and sumpR A q :" ř jPA R j .
A. Model and Definitions
We consider the general multiterminal source model, with a set of m terminals denoted by M " rms " t1, . . . , mu. A terminal j P rms has access to a random variable X j . We denote the multiterminal source by X M " pX 1 , . . . , X m q. Terminals use public discussion over a broadcast channel, that is reliable and authenticated, for a finite number of rounds. A message that is broadcasted by terminal j is a function of the terminal's observations of X j , and the previous public messages. We denote by F the set of all messages sent over the public channel.
Eve has access to the side information Z which is correlated with X M , and full read access to public messages F. Eve is a passive adversary, which means they are not allowed to change, forge, or block public messages of the legitimate terminals. The joint distribution P ZXM is publicly known.
Let A Ď M be the set of terminals who want to establish a shared secret key K, which need not to be fully concealed from the helper terminals in A c . The secret key K is secure against Eve, if it satisfies the reliability and secrecy conditions. Definition 1. Consider a source model pX M , Zq with adversary's side information, Z, and A Ď M denoting the set of terminals that will share a key K with alphabet K. The key is an p , σq-Secret Key (in short p , σq-SK) for A, if there exists a protocol with public communication F, and output RVs tK j u jPA , such that (reliability) Pr tK j " Ku ě 1´ , @j P A,
(1) (secrecy) SD ppK, F, Zq; pU, F, Zqq ď σ,
where SD denotes the statistical distance and U is the uniform probability distribution over alphabet K.
Key Rate of a Protocol: All terminals cooperate so that the terminals in A can obtain a shared secret key. Consider the case that each terminal has n IID samples of their variable, denoted by the vector X n j (i.e., independently sampled from the same distribution P ZXM ).
For a source with probability distribution P ZXM , and for a given n, the secret key rate (SK rate) of an SKA protocol family P that establishes an SK of length P pnq, is P pnq{n. The asymptotically achievable SK rate of a protocol family is rP " lim inf nÑ8 P pnq{n. The secret key capacity of a given source is the supremum of all achievable SK rates.
Definition 2 (Secret Key Capacity).
For a given source model pX M , Zq and a set A Ď M, let S n,σn pX n A |Z n q denote the supremum key length of all p n , σ n q-SKs. Then the secret key capacity is
where the supremum is over all positive n , σ n such that lim nÑ8 p n`σn q " 0.
When Z " const. (i.e., independent of X M ), the capacity is denoted by C SK pX A q, and when Z " X D " pX j | j P Dq with D being the set of (known) compromised terminals, the capacity is denoted by C P K pX A |X D q. An SKA protocol P is capacity achieving for a source model if rP is equal to the capacity of the source.
Theorem 1 (PK Capacity [3] ). In a given source model X M for sharing a secret key among terminals in A Ĺ M, with compromised terminals D Ď A c , the PK capacity is
where
sumpR D c q and
Pairwise Independent Network (PIN) model was defined in [4] .
Definition 3 (PIN model).
A set M " rms of m terminals with X j denoting the RV of terminal j P M, is a Pairwise Independent Network (PIN), if the RVs X j are of the form X j " pV ji | @i P Mztjuq where pairs of RVs tpV ij , V ji q| 1 ď i ă j ď mu are mutually independent.
In [5] , for a general PIN, the capacity of the adversarial model in which Z " tZ ij | i ‰ j P rmsu where Z ij " Z ji , and each Z ij is correlated with pV ij , V ji q was left as an open problem. In this paper, we consider this adversarial model for the special case when V ij " V ji , with P Z|XM " ś i,j P Zij |Vij . The assumption of V ij " V ji is also used in [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] .
III. WSK CAPACITY OF TREE-PIN
The distance dpi, jq between two nodes i and j in a graph, is the number of edges of the shortest path connecting node i and j, in the graph. When the graph is an undirected tree, there is a single path between any two nodes i and j, and their distance dpi, jq will satisfy dpi, jq " dpj, iq.
Definition 4 (Tree-PIN).
A set of m terminals form a Tree-PIN if there exists a tree G " pM, Eq with M " rms such that the RV of any terminal j P M can be represented by X j " pV ji | i P Γpjqq, with V ij " V ji , where all RVs in tV ij | i ă j and e ij P Eu are mutually independent.
Our main contribution is the proof of the following theorem. 
and T pAq is the smallest subtree connecting all nodes of A.
For simplicity, we only present the sketch of the proof for A " M; the general case is proved in the full version [15] . In Section III-A, we prove an upper bound on the WSK capacity, and in Section III-B we give an SKA protocol that achieves this upper bound (asymptotically).
A. The Upper Bound
Consider a Tree-PIN with M " rms and G " pM, Eq. Define an auxiliary source model by adding a cooperating compromised dummy terminal m`1, whose RV is the Eve's side information Z, i.e., X m`1 " X D " Z.
According to the PK capacity theorem ([3, Theorem 2]), the PK capacity of the above auxiliary model is given by
where R CO pX M |Zq denotes the solution to the real-valued Linear Programming (LP) problem represented in Figure 1 . This PK capacity is a natural upper bound on the WSK capacity of the Tree-PIN for A " M. (see [3, Theorem 4] ). Thus, we calculate the PK capacity and prove the following lemma. 
HpV ij |Zq.
Equation (6) implies that finding C P K pX M |Zq reduces to the problem of finding R CO pX M |Zq: that is solving the LP problem of Figure 1 . The following lemma implies Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. For a Tree-PIN with G " pM, Eq, and the set of V ij 's defined as in Definition 4, we have
Proof for Lemma 2 (Sketch): Consider an arbitrary edge e ij P E. By cutting this edge, the set of terminals will be partitioned into two parts. Rewriting the inequalities in the LP of Figure 1 for these two sets of terminals, and considering the facts that P Z|XM " ś i,j P Zij |Vij and V ij 's are mutually independent, we get HpX M |Zq " ř i,j HpV ij |Zq and thus, ÿ jPM R j ě HpX M |Zq´HpV ij |Zq. This holds for any arbitrary i and j, and implies that
In the following proof, we find a rate assignment for R M , that satisfies the constraints of the LP problem in Figure 1 , and achieves the lower bound of (9), thus proving Equation (8) .
Rate assignment: Define HpV i˚j˚| Zq " min i,j HpV ij |Zq, and set the R j rates according to the rate assignment described in Figure 2 . In this rate assignment, the rate R j is divided into |Γpjq| components, where a component r R pjq i corresponds to a neighbor node i P Γpjq of j. Note that for a pair i and j that form an edge in the tree, there exists component rates r R pjq i and r R piq j . The rate assignment rules of Figure 2 assign values to these component rates such that the resulting sum rate ř jPM R j meets the lower bound of (9), while the sum of the component rates r R pjq i and r R piq j does not exceed HpV ij |Zq. Note that there are no loops in an undirected tree, and the path to a node i˚from two adjacent nodes i and j, differs only by one edge. Thus, either i, or j, is the closer of the two to i˚, and the other node is one edge farther. Therefore, the above rate assignment will always succeed.
One can think of this rate assignment protocol as an algorithm that gets a weighted undirected tree as the input and outputs a weighted directed tree such that if R j denotes Let pi˚, j˚q s.t.
r R pi˚q j˚" 0, and @ e ij ‰ e i˚j˚, with dpi, i˚q ă dpj, i˚q, assign r R pjq i " 0, and r R piq j " HpV ij |Zq.
Fig. 2:
The rate assignment that achieves R CO pX M |Zq.
the sum of the outgoing edge weights of node j of the output tree, then ř jPrms R j is minimized. The input tree is a weighted undirected tree for which the weight of e ij is w i,j " HpV ij |Zq. For example, assume that M " r13s, and that the connection of nodes are according to Figure 3a , and assume that pi˚, j˚q " p5, 6q. In the output, we set the weight of e 5,6 to zero, and convert all other undirected weighted edges of the input tree to directed edges with the same weight. The direction of these edges are outwards from nodes 5 (or 6). For each node j P M we set R j to be the sum of the weights of all outgoing edges from node j. For instance, due to Figure 3b , for node 2 we have R 2 " w 1,2`w2,3 " HpV 1,2 |Zq`HpV 2,3 |Zq.
For any e ij ‰ e i˚j˚, we have r R piq j`r R pjq i " HpV ij |Zq, which leads to the sum rate:
The above equation proves that the rate assignment indeed achieves the lower bound of Inequality (9) . It remains to show that the rates assigned to R 1 , . . . , R m , according to the rate assignment described in Figure 2 , do meet the constraints of the LP problem described in Figure 1 . We show that for the assigned rates R 1 , . . . , R m , and for any subset
is satisfied. Specifically, consider the case when e i˚j˚P B. In this case we observe that
where b ě HpV ij |Zq for some j P B and i R B. Due to the definition of HpV i˚j˚| Zq, then condition (11) holds for any B containing pi˚, j˚q. The rest of the argument for other cases can be found in the full version of the paper [15] .
B. The Achievablity
We show that there exists an SKA Protocol that achieves the upper bound in (7) . This proves the tightness of the bound.
In the SKA protocol, each pair of adjacent nodes pi, jq establish a pairwise key S ij of length approximately equal to nC, where C " min i,j HpV ij |Zq. Then, each node j P M for every i 1 ‰ i and i 1 , i P Γpjq, sends F ji " S ij ' S ji 1 over the public channel, where ' is the bitwise XOR operation. We show that the protocol results in a secure key shared among all terminals in M. We note that our definition of secrecy (Definition 1) is different from the secrecy definition in [3] . However, the two definitions are equivalent.
Lemma 3 (The Achievability). For a given Tree-PIN pX M , Zq defined by G " pM, Eq, there exists an SKA protocol P that achieves the maximum asymptotic secret key rate of rP " min i,j HpV ij |Zq.
In our security proof, we use statistical distances of distributions. For instance, consider the example of three terminals where X 1 " V 12 , X 2 " pV 12 , V 23 q, and X 3 " V 23 . Assume, HpV 12 |Zq ď HpV 23 |Zq. Then for any δ ą 0, terminals generate pairwise secret keys S 12 and S 23 with length " tnpHpV 12 |Zq´δqu that are p , σq´SKs; i.e., for any i, j SDppS ij , Q ij , Zq; pU, Q ij , Zqq ď σ, where U is the uniform distribution over t0, 1u and Q ij denotes the public communication used to generate S ij . If terminal 2 broadcasts F 23 " S 12 ' S 23 , then all terminals can agree on K " S 12 . We show that K is a p2 , 4σq´SK. See the full proof in the full version of the paper [15] .
IV. DISCUSSION
We prove the following upper bound on the WSK capacity of a general PIN model with the assumption of V ij " V ji . We show that this bound is tight for the special case of A " M and |A| " 2. See the full version for the proof [15] .
Lemma 4. For any given PIN pX M , Zq, we have
where the minimization is over all partitions of M such that for every part of the partition there exists a node in that part that is also in A. In a partition P a pair of nodes pi, jq crosses P, if i and j are in different parts of P.
Moreover, we obtain the following lower bound on the WSK capacity of a general PIN, using the Steiner tree packing methods of [5] . A Steiner tree of G for terminals of A is a subtree of G that spans (connects) all terminals in A. A family of edge-disjoint Steiner trees is called a Steiner tree packing [16] . We show that for each family with Steiner trees, a secret key of length can be generated. Let µpG, Aq denote the maximum cardinality of such family. Therefore, for a general wiretapped PIN we have the following. Corollary 1. The WSK capacity of a PIN pX M , Zq defined by G " pM, Eq for SKA in A Ď M is lower-bounded by
where N is the set of n's such that nHpV ij |Zq for any pi, jq is integer-valued and for each n, we define a multigraph G n " pM, E n q such that for any e ij P E of G there exists nHpV ij |Zq edges between nodes i and j in E n .
Proof: For a given n P N , each pair of connected nodes pi, jq establish a pairwise key S ij of length approximately equal to nHpV ij |Zq. There exists a Steiner tree packing with cardinality µpG n , Aq; thus, for any Steiner tree of this Steiner packing, the terminals in A can establish one bit of shared secret key due to Theorem 2. Thus, the asymptotic SK rate of sup nPN 1 n µpG n , Aq is achievable. For the special case of A " M or |A| " 2, the problem of calculating µpG n , Aq is efficiently solvable [16] ; rendering the above lower bound to be tight for A " M or |A| " 2. Remark 1. Let R SK pX M q denote the minimum public communication rate required for achieving C SK pX M q. That is min P p1{nq log |FpPq|, where FpPq denotes the overall public communication required by the SKA protocol P. It was proved in [17] that for PIN model with V ij " V ji , we have R SK pX M q " pm´2qC SK pX M q. We show that for any Tree-PIN we have R W SK pX M |Zq ď pm´2qC W SK pX M |Zq, where R W SK denotes the minimum public communication rate required for achieving the WSK capacity. The proof is in the full version [15] . We conjecture that this bound is tight for any wiretapped PIN.
Remark 2. We note that Theorem 2 is consistent with the result of [3, Example 7] for a Markov Chain defined on a tree. Our proof for Theorem 2 presents an SKA protocol that does not require omniscience; however, the proposed protocol of [3] needs to achieve omniscience which requires communication rate of at least HpX M |Zq´min i,j HpV ij |Zq.
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